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 Multinationals at Risk:  Terrorism and the Rule of 
Law 
Frederick V. Perry 
If you wish to converse with me, define your terms.1 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Companies and commerce are at risk.  Even if they are not them-
selves the specific targets of attacks, experience seems to show that 
they can be victims of collateral damage.  Faced with the dangers and 
prospects of coping with terrorist attacks, in the view of the author, 
companies are at risk for at least two major reasons.  The first is that 
the world community confronts a dilemma – trying to combat some-
thing that it cannot clearly identify or define: terrorism.2  The interna-
tional community has so far dealt with the problem by means of a va-
riety of piecemeal, crime-specific treaties; nothing comprehensive and 
nothing that defines terrorism.3  The second problem is the apparent 
lack on the part of many companies to take the threat seriously and 
harden themselves as targets, or at least make themselves less attrac-
tive targets.4  
States are challenged with the problem of identifying those acts 
of “terror” that are designed to bring about political change: activity 
which disrupts international relations through violence that the world 
views as undesirable international norms of behavior.5  Globalization 
                                                                                                                           
  Clinical Professor of Business Law, Florida International University.  The Author 
acknowledges with gratitude the able assistance in research and editorial comment of Alexandra 
Kagan, a Ph.D. student at Florida International University. 
 1 David A. Green, “I’m OK - You’re OK” Educating Lawyers to “Maintain a Normal 
Client-Lawyer Relationship” With a Client With a Mental Disability, 28 J. LEGAL PROF. 65, 65 
(2003) (quoting phrase commonly attributed to Voltaire).  
 2 Kofi Anan, Secretary General of the United Nations, A Global Strategy for Fighting 
Terrorism, Keynote Address at the Closing Plenary of the International Summit on Democracy, 
Terrorism and Security (March 8-11, 2005), (transcript available at http://english.safe-
democracy.org/keynotes/a-global-strategy-for-fighting-terrorism.html#audio). 
 3 Id.  
 4 Id. 
 5 John Dugard, Towards the Definition of International Terrorism, 67 AM. J. INT’L L. 94, 
94 (1973). 
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increases firms’ vulnerability, as multinational corporations are on the 
front lines around the world;6 they are exposed, mostly as soft targets 
of opportunity for terrorist attacks, since, in the minds of many would-
be terrorists, they become a symbol or proxy for their home coun-
tries.7  Thus, attacking a multinational, its employees, or its facilities, is 
often considered an attack on the home country,8 since it is simpler 
than traveling to the United States, for example, in order to attack a 
symbol of its lifestyle (McDonald’s)9 or its rampant capitalism (the 
pharmaceutical industry).10   
The purpose of this paper is two-fold: first, to examine the scope 
of the problem of terrorism as it affects business in general, and se-
cond, the dilemma posed by a lack of definition of the term “terror-
ism.”  This paper suggests that a case can be made that the world real-
ly does need a universal definition of terrorism, and that companies 
should take threats seriously, or at least more than they appear to 
have done.  Finally, this paper suggests a way to arrive at universal 
consensus on a legal definition of the term “terrorism.” 
II.  BUSINESS AS TARGET 
Of course, Osama Bin Laden is now dead.  Some say that al-
Qaeda will die with him,11 or that the fear of the threat of terrorist 
attacks is overblown.12  Others are not so sure.13  Documents retrieved 
in the raid on Osama Bin Laden’s compound indicate that al-Qaeda 
may have been planning raids on oil tankers worldwide in order to 
disrupt the world’s energy supplies.14    
                                                                                                                           
 6 See generally Barbara Krug & Patrick Reinmoeller, The Hidden Costs of Ubiquity:  
Globalisation and Terrorism, 2003 ROTTERDAM INST. OF MGMT, http://repub.eur.nl/ 
res/pub/993/ERS%20062.pdf. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id.  
 11 Fareed Zakaria, Al Qaeda is Over, THE GLOBAL PUBLIC SQUARE, CNN WORLD (May 
2, 2011), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/05/02/al-qaeda-is-dead/; see also Miriam 
F. Elman, After Osama Bin Laden: The Future of Al Qaeda and the Study of Terrorism, 
CONFLICT & COLLABORATION (May 3, 2011),  
http://conflictandcollaboration.wordpress.com/2011/05/ 
03/after-osama-bin-laden-the-future-of-al-qaeda-and-the-study-of-terrorism/. 
 12 John Mueller, Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?, 85 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2, 2, 4-5 (2006). 
 13 The Future of Al Qaeda after Bin Laden, PUB. RADIO INT’L (May 3, 2011), 
http://www.pri.org/stories/world/middle-east/the-future-of-al-qaeda-after-bin-laden.html. 
 14 Teresa Anderson, Morning Security Brief: Lawmakers Discuss Border Issues, DHS 
Warns Oil Industry, and the Patriot Act Extended, SEC. MGMT. (May 23, 2011), http://www. 
securitymanagement.com/news/morning-security-brief-lawmakers-discuss-border-issues-dhs-warns 
-oil-industry-and-patriot-act-e.  
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Whether or not al-Qaeda survives, many believe that the prob-
lem of international terrorism and its causes goes much deeper than 
one man and his organization.15  This could mean that terrorism will 
be with us for a while because the current phenomenon of unpredict-
able international terrorist attacks by non-state actors seems to be a 
reaction to globalization and is facilitated by it.16  It appears, at least, 
that Osama Bin Laden’s franchisees, imitators, those who have been 
inspired by him, and those who are motivated by other grievances will 
continue to pose a threat to the international community.17  New 
threats continue to be debated,18 and as Professor Dean C. Alexander 
has stated, “The daily barrage of predictions of terrorist attacks 
against numerous business targets – chemical plants, shopping malls, 
aviation, mass transit, and financial institutions – has accelerated the 
need to highlight additional lessons learned thus far on the impact of 
terrorism on business.”19 
Terrorism seems to be the economical weapon of choice of the 
weak actor against the strong nation-state.  For the organization that 
wishes to seek revenge, extract something, convince a population or 
government to take some path or abstain from some policy, it is cer-
tainly far cheaper to terrorize than to engage in conventional military 
operations.  Armies do not have to be supported in the field, large 
amounts of heavy weapons do not have to be purchased, and no uni-
forms need to be bought.  A well-placed bomb here or there, a strate-
gic kidnapping, and an assassination all can work to affect many 
minds on the cheap.  “As an asymmetric form of conflict, it confers 
coercive power with many of the advantages of military force at a 
fraction of the cost.  Due to the secretive nature and small size of ter-
rorist organizations, they often offer opponents no clear organization 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See generally JAMAL R. NASSAR, GLOBALIZATION & TERRORISM: THE MIGRATION 
OF DREAMS AND NIGHTMARES 23-42 (Manfred B. Steger et al. eds, 2d ed. 2010). 
 16 Audrey Kurth Cronin, Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism, 27 
INT’L SEC. 30, 30-58 (2002-2003). 
 17 Richard N. Haass, Terrorism Concerns after Bin Laden, THE BLOG, HUFFINGTON POST 
(May 2, 2011, 9:44 AM), http://huffingtonpost.com/richard-n-haass/terrorism-concerns-after-
_b_856253.html. 
 18 The World’s Policeman, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/ 
opinion/nypd-blind-threat-york-terrorism-iran-article-1.1016282; see also Protecting America: 
Are We Doing Enough?, Interview with Philip Zelikow by  & , 11 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 149, 151, 
154-156 (March 5, 2010); Terrorism: What is the State of Global Terrorism Today, Nearly a 
Decade After the Sept. 11 Attacks? Foreign Policy Asked the Top Terrorism Experts in the 
Field. Here's What They Told Us, 89 FOREIGN POL’Y 96 (2011); , Solutions for a World in Cri-
sis, 41 THE FUTURIST 3, 3 (2007). 
 19 DEAN C. ALEXANDER, BUSINESS CONFRONTS TERRORISM: RISKS AND RESPONSES 17 
(2004).  
46 FIU Law Review [7:43 
to defend against or to deter.”20  As one writer has said: “Terrorism is 
designed to have a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead. . . . 
[S]ince terrorism is designed for an audience and not just victims; the 
media has played a crucial role. . . .”21  In fact, terrorism is witnessed 
by most people through the media.  
According to Professors Larobina and Pate of Sacred Heart Uni-
versity: “Terrorism has impacted multiple levels of society across the 
world community.  One of those levels is the business environment.”22  
One of the aims of terrorism seems to be to disrupt and destroy ongo-
ing business,23 providing both a show of victims and an interruption of 
commerce.24  If that is the case, then the ability of governments to dis-
rupt and destroy terrorism may be essential to the continued growth 
and expansion of the world economy.  
The United States is a frequent target of such attacks, and United 
States’ business interests are at the front line, so to speak, all over the 
globe.25  According to one writer, more than two-thirds of the United 
States’ targets of international terrorism attacks in 1999 were United 
States’ businesses.26  As a practical matter, of course, companies the 
world over – and not just those based in the United States – are po-
tential targets. 
The World Trade Center was first bombed on February 26, 
1993.27  Because of the nature of 9/11, any security preparation that 
the World Trade Center might have undertaken between the two at-
tacks availed very little.  The World Travel and Tourism Council said 
that terrorist attacks “have dampened short-term demand for Travel 
& Tourism and created a more uncertain world.”28  In 2003, the Coun-
cil issued a “Travel and Tourism Security Action Plan” with the aim 
                                                                                                                           
 20 What is Terrorism?, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND SECURITY RESEARCH, 
http://www.terrorism-research.com/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2012).   
 21 Luke Howie, A Role for Business in the War on Terror, 18 DISASTER PREVENTION 
MGMT. 100, 101 (2009). 
 22 Michael D. Larobina & Richard L. Pate, The Impact of Terrorism on Business, 3 J. 
GLOBAL BUS. ISSUES 147, 147 (2009). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Krug & Reinmoelle  999). ,,al Crimesural Stud., International Terrorism, N Counter-
Terrorism Treaties, supra note 6. 
 25 Paul R. Pillar, Is the Terrorist Threat Misunderstood?, 45 SEC. MGMT. 136, 136 (2001).  
 26 Id. 
 27 See World Trade Center Bombed, HISTORY.COM (Feb. 26, 1993), 
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/world-trade-center-bombed.  
 28 Travel & Tourism Security Action Plan, WORLD TRAVEL & TOURISM COUNCIL 1 
(2003), available at 
http://fama2.us.es:8080/turismo/turismonet1/economia%20del%20turismo/mercados 
%20turisticos/travel%20and%20tourism%20security%20plan.pdf. 
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“to limit potential damage wrought by terrorism and ultimately to 
defeat it.”29 
Business facilities worldwide, and executives and employees – 
both travelling and stationary – are vulnerable.30   Companies must 
work to reduce the threat of murders, bombings, and kidnappings for 
ransom (some terrorist organizations finance themselves in this way).31  
For corporations with a worldwide footprint, problems can occur at 
any moment as they have in New York in 2001, Madrid in 2004, Lon-
don in 2005, Mumbai in 2010,32 and Moscow in 2010.33  In 2005, the 
Grand Hyatt, Radisson, and Days Inn were attacked by terrorist 
bombers in Amman, Jordan, killing 60 people and injuring 115.34  In 
January 2012, Kenyan authorities warned their population of an im-
pending terror threat.35  According to one study, the United Kingdom 
is at greater risk of terrorist attacks than any other country.36  In Feb-
ruary 2012, four British subjects pled guilty to a plot to bomb the 
London Stock Exchange.37  In January of the same year, two men 
were sentenced to prison by a court in Oslo, Norway,38 for plotting to 
attack a Danish newspaper which had printed cartoons of the Prophet 
Muhammad in 2005.39  
Global trade is growing – albeit slowed down by the recession of 
2008 and 2009 – and with it non-governmental organizations 
(“NGO”), for-profit corporations, and the incidents of individual 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Id.  
 30 Charlene Marmer Solomon, Global Business Under Siege, WORKFORCE (Jan. 1, 1997), 
http://www.workforce.com/article/19970101/NEWS02/301019961.  
 31 Id. 
 32 Robert Johnston, Deadliest Terrorist Strikes, Worldwide, JOHNSTON’S ARCHIVE, 
http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wrjp255i.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2012). 
 33 Luke Harding & Mark Tran, Moscow Bombs Kills Dozens, THE GUARDIAN (March 29, 
2010), guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/29/moscow-metro-bombs-explosions-terror. 
 34 Dean C. Alexander, Anti-terror Calculations: What’s Next?, SECURITY (March 16, 
2006), http://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/anti-terror-calculations-whats-next-1. 
 35 Britain Warns of Increased Risk of Terror Attack in Kenya, TIMES OF INDIA (Jan. 8, 
2012), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/Britain-warns-of-increased-risk-of-
terror-attack-in-Kenya/articleshow/11409453.cms. 
 36 UK at Greater Terror Attack Risk Than Any Other Western Nation: Study, THE ECON. 
TIMES (Aug. 4, 2011), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-08-04/news/29850521_ 
1_terrorism-risk-index-uk-maplecroft. 
 37 Jennifer Rowland, Four Plead Guilty to London Stock Exchange Plot, FOREIGN 
POLICY (Feb. 3, 2012), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/03/the_lwot_four_plead_guilty_to_ 
london_stock_exchange_plot. (The Legal War on Terror Brief is a special project of the New 
America Foundation and Foreign Policy and is published as a series by Foreign Policy). 
38  Id.  
 39  Id. 
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travel abroad, thereby increasing vulnerability.40  In short, business is 
at risk.  Aside from all other asset-based risks, under the common law, 
at least, companies owe a duty of care to their employees, meaning 
the company should take reasonable precautions to protect its em-
ployees against foreseeable risk.  If they do not, they could be found 
liable in tort.41  How do they do that in light of the risks that are being 
run?42  Further, managers must involve themselves in counter-
terrorism and in security issues inasmuch as they have the obligation 
of protecting customers, clients, and the public,43 leading one set of 
writers to say that “protecting a firm’s resource base against terrorism 
is as crucial a management task as increasing its asset’s value.”44  A 
study by the Economist Intelligence unit provides that: 
Where businesses are the target of terrorism, it is usuallybecause 
of what they represent, rather than anything they do or don’t do 
themselves. Global brands can assume symbolic significance for 
terrorists.  The US National Counterterrorism Center’s list of 
significant terrorist events describes 24 attacks on McDonald’s 
restaurants between 1993 and 2005 worldwide. Of the minority 
where responsibility was claimed, motivation for the attacks in-
cluded nationalism, anti-globalisation, religion and Marxism – 
but in each case the perpetrators objected to the restaurant as a 
symbol of America, not a purveyor of products.45  
How does a corporation prepare for the unknown?  According to 
some security specialists, some companies should not only attempt to 
reduce risk – since they cannot eliminate it – but they should also have 
contingency plans for when a disaster strikes.46   
Risk Management Solutions, a provider of products and services 
to manage and quantify catastrophic risk, believes that since govern-
ments have taken many strides to lower the risk of terrorist attacks 
against government and military targets, terrorists are more likely to 
target the commercial or private sector, especially sporting events.47  
                                                                                                                           
 40 Rachel Briggs, Keeping Your People Safe: The Legal and Policy Framework for Duty of 
Care 7 (The Foreign Policy Centre, Working Paper No. 1, 2003), available at http://fpc. 
org.uk/fsblob/126.pdf.  
 41 Id. 
 42 Id.   
 43 Howie, supra note 21. 
 44 Barbara Krug & Patrick Reinmoeller, The Hidden Costs of Ubiquity: Globalisation and 
Terrorism, ROTTERDAM INST. OF MGMT. 41 (2003).   
 45 Lord Levene, Under Attack? Global Business and the Threat of Political Violence, 
ECON. INT’L UNIT LTD. & LLOYD’S 2, 14 (2007). 
 46 Diane Ritchey, Going Global, SECURITY MAGAZINE (Jan. 1, 2011), 
http://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/81594-going-global 
 47 See RISK MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS, http://www.rms.com/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2012). 
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They simply are softer targets.  The facts seem to bear this out, and 
the terrorists of today tend to kill and injure indiscriminately as many 
as they can, mostly or almost exclusively civilians; they generally 
choose tourist facilities, hotels, mass transit, and business facilities as 
targets.48  As can be seen from the following chart (Figure 1),49 the 
great majority of attacks in 2010 did not target government or military 
targets, but rather, the targets were civilians, and included companies 
and infrastructures. 
Figure 1:50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Terrorist attacks normally have an effect on stock markets in 
causing significant negative abnormal returns; that is, stocks lose val-
ue.51  Terrorism can actually have multiple effects on the securities 
market.
 52  Moody’s has downgraded a number of securities because 
they believed the securities to have inadequate terrorism insurance.53  
                                                                                                                           
 48 Michael R. Czinkota et al., Terrorism and International Business: A Research Agenda, 
41 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 826, 829 (2010).  
 49 2010 Report on Terrorism, THE NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER (Apr. 30, 2011), 
http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/docs/2010_report_on_terrorism.pdf. 
 50 Id.  
 51 Doug McIntyre, Terrorism’s Effects on Wall Street, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 9, 2011), 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/terrorism.asp.  
 52 Dean Starkman, Moody's Downgrades Securities on Lack of Terrorism Insurance, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2002, at C.14. 
 53 Id.  
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Further, one analysis of shareholder returns following the 9/11 attacks 
indicates that the market value of publicly-traded companies with a 
high percentage of foreign sales fell disproportionately immediately 
following the attacks, and those same companies continued trading at 
a discount one year later.54   
Terrorist violence is a global risk, and it affects the worldwide 
economy and financial markets in general.  We know that the imme-
diate effect of such attacks is an immediate aversion for risk on the 
part of investors.  Investors in stock markets, as mentioned above, and 
consumers in the intermediate and longer term also lose confidence 
and become risk averse, so that consumption and investment are both 
lowered.  This effect spills over not only to stock markets, but also to 
fixed-income market yields, currency, and commodity markets.  The 
result is an adverse effect on economic activity, in general, often trig-
gering an economic slowdown, maybe even a recession.55   
Stock markets around the world negatively reacted to the terror-
ist attacks in New York on 9/11, as evidenced in the following chart 
(Table 1). 
Table 1 – Stock Reactions to Terrorist Attacks on 9/11/2001:56 
Country Symbol 
Exchange 
Name 
Closing 
price on 
09/10/01 
Closing 
price on 
09/17/01 
Recovered 
to closing 
price from 
09/10/2001 
on… at… 
United 
States DJI 
Dow Jones 
Industrial 
Average 
9,605.51 8,920.70 11/09/2001 9,608.00 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Michael Hergeil, The Effect of Terrorist Attacks on Shareholder Value: A Study of 
United States International Firms, 21 INT’L J. MGMT. 25, 25 (2004). 
 55 G. Andrew Karolyi, The Consequences of Terrorism for Financial Markets: What Do 
We Know? 1 (Fisher College of Bus. at Ohio State Univ., Working Paper, May 7, 2006), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=904398. 
 56 DJI – Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EDJI+ 
Historical+Prices (last visited Aug. 1, 2012); IXIC – Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE, 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EIXIC+Historical+Prices (last visited Aug. 1, 2012); DAX 
– Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE, 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EGDAXI+Historical 
+Prices (last visited Aug. 1, 2012); FTSE – Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE, http:// 
finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EFTSE+Historical+Prices (last visited Aug. 1, 2012);  IBEX – 
Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EIBEX+Historical 
+Prices (last visited Aug. 1, 2012); N100 – Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE, 
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EN100+Historical+Prices (last visited Aug. 1, 2012). 
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United 
States IXIC NASDAQ 1,695.38 1,579.55 
10/11/2001 
1,701.47 
Germany DAX 
Frankfurt 
Stock 
Exchange 
4,670.13 4,243.68 10/11/2001 4,718.46 
United 
Kingdom 
FTSE 
London 
Stock 
Exchange 
5,033.70 4,898.90 10/05/2001 5,036.00 
Spain IBEX 
BME 
Spanish 
Exchanges 
7,678.70 7,094.80 10/17/2001 7,918.60 
Belgium, 
France, 
Holland, 
Portugal 
N100 Euronext 759.13 710.99 10/23/2001 761.86 
The train bombings in Madrid on March 11, 2004 had a negative 
effect on European markets, as can be seen from the following chart 
(Table 2). 
Table 2 – Stock Reactions to Madrid Train Bombings 
on 03/11/2004:57 
Country Symbol Exchange Name 
Closing 
price on 
03/10/04 
Closing 
price on 
03/17/04 
Recovered 
to closing 
price from 
03/10/2004 
on… at… 
Germany DAX 
Frankfurt 
Stock 
Exchange 
4,044.70 3,896.89 04/05/2004 4,048.60 
United 
Kingdom FTSE 
London 
Stock 
Exchange 
4,545,30 4,456.80 04/16/2004 4,537.30 
Spain IBEX 
BME 
Spanish 
Exchanges 
8,292.90 7,948.10 04/07/2004 8,294.80 
Belgium, 
France, N100 Euronext 643.48 626.45
04/05/2004 
644.16
                                                                                                                           
 57 Id. 
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Holland, 
Portugal 
Tourism, airline travel, and stock markets suffered nearly un-
precedented declines after the attacks of 9/11 and the Madrid train 
bombings, but they appear to have recovered thereafter.58  Such re-
covery may have given rise to some level of complacency, as will be 
seen below.  Some believe that the price of gold has soared because of 
the terrorist threat.59   
How do we measure the cost of the effects and risks presented by 
terrorist attacks?  Paul Krugman, the Nobel Prize winning, Princeton 
economist, has said that: 
We can say that the economic costs of terrorism are similar, in 
principle, to the economic costs of crime.  As surveys like Glae-
ser (1999) point out, these costs can be divided into the direct 
losses from criminal acts; the costs of spending on law enforce-
ment; and the costs of distorted individual decisions because of 
fear of crime.60 
In other words, the costs are diffused with effects spreading over 
a broad spectrum of society.   What do terrorist attacks cost us?  What 
does the fear of terrorist attacks and increased security cost business-
es?  According to the Office of the Comptroller of New York City, 
the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attack cost New York 
City $27 billion during the first 15 months following the event.61  By 
2010, the Transportation Security Administration had spent $40 bil-
lion screening passengers since September 2001.62  The lost time be-
cause of waiting for security checks at airports – since “time is money” 
– is measured in the billions.63 
In 2009, the insurance payouts after the 9/11 attack – according to 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics – was $39.4 billion, which accounts for 
payouts in a variety of insurance lines, as set forth in the following 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Larobina, supra note 22, at 147; see also DEAN C. ALEXANDER, BUSINESS CONFRONTS 
TERRORISM: RISKS AND RESPONSES 17 (2004). 
 59 Banamber Mishra & Matiur Rahman, The Dynamics of Bombay Stock, U.S. Stock and 
London Gold Markets, 4 INDIAN J. ECON. BUS. 151 (2005). 
 60 Paul Krugman, Professor, Econ. & Int’l Affairs, Princeton Univ., Address at The Nexus 
of Terrorism & WMDs: Developing a Consensus at Princeton University, The Cost of Terror-
ism: What Do We Know? (Dec. 12-14, 2004), available at http://www.l20.org/publications/9_ 
7Q_wmd_krugman.pdf (citing E. Glaeser, An Overview of Crime and Punishment, WORLD 
BANK (1999)).  
 61 Matthew Bandyk, What Airport Security Costs You, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 
(Jan. 11, 2010), http://money.usnews.com/money/business-economy/articles/2010/01/11/what-
airport-security-costs-you. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
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chart (Figure 2).64  However, this does not take into account all of the 
losses for New York City, which appear to be around $95 billion.65 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Claire Wilkinson & Robert P. Hartwig, Terrorism Risk: A Reemergent Threat, 
INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE 3 (Apr. 2010), 
http://www.iii.org/assets/docs/pdf/Terrorism 
Threat_042010.pdf. 
 65 Daniel Indiviglio, The Economic Cost of Terrorism, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 28, 2009), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2009/12/the-economic-cost-of-terrorism/32650/.  
54 FIU Law Review [7:43 
Figure 2:66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After the 9/11 attacks, insurance companies either increased their 
rates for terrorism coverage or dropped such coverage altogether.67  
The biggest impact of insurance hikes has been felt in the aviation 
industry, in addition to other industrial sectors.68  It is estimated that 
overall insurance premiums have increased by an average of thirty 
percent, with certain assumed targets experiencing higher increases.69  
A terrorist attack is intentional, and therefore, it is difficult to predict 
with any accuracy the frequency or severity of such attacks.  This has 
made some insurance industry analysts question whether the risk is 
insurable at all.70  
Generally, insurance exists to alleviate the insured’s potential 
losses and create profit for the insurer.  This twofold objective is 
achieved in great part by calculating measurement costs, that is, 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Wilkinson & Hartwig, supra note 64. 
 67 OECD, Economic Consequences of Terrorism, 124 OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 
71 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/60/1935314.pdf. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id.  
 70 Wilkinson & Hartwig, supra note 64. 
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the probability that a risk will materialize and the magnitude of 
the loss in case of the materialization.  Insurance coverage and 
profitability rest on the accuracy of this calculation.  Terrorism, 
on the other hand, exists to create a perpetual threat and chronic 
fear of unpredictable, future risks of losses.  In essence, the con-
cepts of insurance and terrorism are diametrically opposed.  Ul-
timately, terrorism renders risk probability and loss magnitude 
nearly incalculable, consequently decreasing the insurance mar-
ket's profitability and hence its coverage.71  
Companies have had to purchase enhanced insurance coverage, 
which is often not available, and certainly not for the prices of the 
past.72  Travelling employees and executives have to be protected; 
company facilities have to be turned into hardened targets.  Different 
states take different attitudes toward terrorism insurance, some re-
quiring it and some helping in its provision.73  Further, states consider 
that the international food supply could be a target.74   Of course, it is 
mostly multinationals who produce, store, and transport food.75  The 
maritime industry is also considered vulnerable.76 
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What is the world community doing about all of this to protect its 
companies and its commerce from interdiction or destruction?  Do 
the business enterprises of the world have protection under interna-
tional law?  We know that technology provides for us the unprece-
dented opportunity for communication, connections, transfers, and a 
host of other things that increase prosperity for people and for com-
panies, but at the same time, the concentration of intricate networks 
and assets also provide for a hitherto unprecedented vulnerability for 
individuals, governments, and corporations.   
In a speech at an internet security conference in 2010, FBI Direc-
tor Robert Mueller said that “[m]ilitant groups, foreign states and 
criminal organizations pose a growing threat to U.S. security as they 
target government and private computer networks.”
 77  He believes 
that groups such as al-Qaeda will use the Internet, not simply as a re-
cruiting and financing tool, but also to make cyber-attacks on the de-
veloped world.78  Of course, such security problems and threats of at-
tack are also dilemmas for companies and nationals of states other 
than the United States. 
The Pentagon believes that China has developed the ability to in-
filtrate and manipulate many “secure” governmental systems.79  In 
fact, the Pentagon computer system was hacked into in 2008.80  Ap-
parently 24,000 files were stolen,81 seemingly regarding the new F-35 
strike fighter under development.82  Cyber-security appears to be a 
question on the minds of many, and a spirited debate is underway as 
to what the proper role of government in this area should be.83 For 
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example, should government provide security to private networks, or 
should government require that private networks provide their own 
security pursuant to mandated standards?  As a practical matter, the 
internet is vast and does not readily lend itself to over-arching security 
measures by anyone.84  The United States Congress appears con-
cerned, and more than thirty Cyber Security bills have been intro-
duced in Congress; now, there seems to be enough momentum to pass 
one of them.85 
Weapons technology hackers, cyber-terrorists, or terrorists who 
wish to cripple a large-area power grid can do so with relative ease.86  
Individuals and groups have developed the desire and the technical 
capacity to damage or destroy inanimate objects as well as individuals, 
and they do.87  Our systems and facilities are more and more vulnera-
ble to attacks.88  This provides a distinct vulnerability for advanced 
societies, their facilities and other assets, especially for the companies 
belonging to those advanced societies.89  Companies and governments 
are spending time and money to learn how to deal with cyber-
terrorists.
 90  Some companies are paying considerable sums to learn 
about intrusion detection, advanced firewalls, public key infrastruc-
ture (a framework for the secure exchange of digital information), and 
forensics, among other things.91  Some companies also want to make 
themselves “hard targets” in order to dissuade terrorist attacks.92 
A survey by Security Magazine showed that after the 9/11 at-
tacks, 87% of corporate security departments took action to re-
evaluate their security programs, upgrade, and hire new staff.93  Ac-
cording to Bill Anderson, Director of Global Security for Ryder Sys-
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tem Inc.,94 “the danger of an attack involving the international trans-
portation system remains high.”95 
Although business is now more aware of its vulnerability than 
ever before, except for an early post-9/11 spurt, corporations neither 
appear to have greatly increased their security expenditures nor to 
have hired large numbers of security personnel after 9/11.96  Most 
small businesses simply cannot afford to.97  However, some large cor-
porations have now hired chief security officers – with law enforce-
ment backgrounds rather than business – and a few business and 
transportation industry terrorism task forces have been formed to 
focus on the issue.98  One industry that appears to have trouble adjust-
ing to the post-9/11 world is the insurance industry, since the Federal 
support plan for terrorism risk insurance,99 which was supposed to 
have been a stop gap, temporary program to aid the insurance indus-
try to adjust, has been extended twice, most recently for seven years.100 
Terrorism is not new, and the risk of terrorist attacks to multina-
tionals was not heralded in only by the events of September 11, 
2001.101  As early as 1993, some commentators were worried that “vir-
tually every multinational organization and its visible management 
team are at least theoretically susceptible to terrorist attack.”102  It was 
estimated that IBM spent $100 million on its worldwide security in 
1993.103  Data show that most terrorist attacks since the 1960s are di-
rected at people, business, and infrastructure related to business.104  
However, The Economist has warned that American businesses are 
                                                                                                                           
 94 Ryder System, Inc., a Fortune 500 transportation services company, considers itself a 
“provider of leading-edge transportation, logistics and supply chain management solutions.” 
About Us, RYDER SYS., http://www.ryder.com/aboutus_home.shtml (last visited Mar. 30, 2012). 
 95 Bill Anderson, Strengthening Global Supply Chain Security, SECURITY MAGAZINE 
(June 17, 2008), http://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/strengthening-global-supply-chain-
security-1. 
 96 Larobina, supra note 22, at 147.  
 97 Rachel Emma Silverman, Workplace Security (A Special Report) – Changing Work-
place – Under the Radar: For Most Small Business, Increased Security Seems Like an Unneces-
sary Cost, WALL ST. J.  (Mar. 11, 2002). 
 98 Larobina, supra note 22, at 152.  
 99 Terrorism Risk Ins. Act Of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat 2322 (2002). 
 100 Terrorism Risk Ins. Extension Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–144, 119 Stat 2660 (2005); 
Terrorism Risk I Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–160, 121 Stat 1839 
(2007). 
 101 Corporate Terrorism: A New Global Threat, 79 MGMT. REV. 39 (1990); Robert S. 
Fleming, Assessing Organizational Vulnerability to Acts of Terrorism, 63 S.A.M. ADVANCED 
MGMT. J. 27 (1998). 
 102 Barton Laurence, Terrorism as an International Business Crisis, 31 MGMT. DECISION 22 
(1993). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Czinkota, supra note 48, at 826-43.  
2011] Multinationals at Risk 59 
not taking the dangers posed by potential terrorist attacks seriously 
and have not sufficiently bolstered their defenses since 9/11.105   
A variety of studies show that many businesses are not spending 
what some feel they should for security,106 and some industry officials, 
such as the healthcare industry, in particular, fear that more should be 
spent in this area.107  According to the Conference Board,108 the spend-
ing that has been done has not been evenly-distributed across indus-
tries.109  Perhaps, primarily because most believe they will not be a 
target and that the odds are on their side.  After all, terrorists only 
have the means to make so many attacks.  Small companies spend the 
least, both as a finite number and as a percentage of revenues.110  
However, despite the fact that the majority of international or multi-
national enterprises may not directly suffer from terrorist attacks, 
they will likely suffer indirectly.111  Such indirect impact takes the form 
of declines in buyer demand; increased international business transac-
tions costs; interruptions in international supply chains; and govern-
ment policies, regulations, and procedures enacted to deal with terror-
ism that hamper the flow of business and cause declines in foreign 
direct investment.112 
The random nature of attacks – no one can predict them – and 
the willingness or the desire to inflict great numbers of non-combatant 
casualties has made modern-day terrorism more “terrifying.”
 113 
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Religiously inspired terrorists may be especially dangerous.  Re-
ligious terrorists [which many of the al-Qaeda claim themselves 
to be] often feel engaged in a struggle of good against evil.  Most 
undertake violent behavior to please the perceived commands of 
a deity, which can make them relatively unconstrained by secular 
laws or values.  Religious terrorists are often alienated from the 
existing social system, which they seek to eliminate rather than 
improve.  They typically receive popular support from people 
and organizations in countries and cultures around the world.114 
The trading nations of the world are increasingly vulnerable to 
international terrorist activities, as are – because they are on the front 
line, so to speak – the companies that conduct the business between 
those trading nations.   
More than $1 billion USD in goods cross the Mexican border dai-
ly.115  In 2003, ships unloaded 18 million 40-foot cargo containers filled 
with goods at United States’ ports.116  This is what happens close to 
home for Americans.  A similar increase in cargo-shipping activity has 
taken place worldwide.117  The United States Customs and Border 
Protection service has implemented a container security program that 
thousands of importers, carriers, and freight intermediaries have 
signed up for.118  Such programs cost money and if the overseas ex-
porter does not want to be troubled by the requirements, a small 
United States importer has little power to change its mind, though 
large companies like Wal-Mart have little trouble in forcing compli-
ance.119  
This enormous amount of traffic gives rise to multiple targets for 
interdiction or destruction.  Further, the number of containers and 
trucks crossing borders provides multiple opportunities for terrorists 
to smuggle themselves and their weapons, hidden in trucks or con-
tainers, into target countries.120  Likewise, world financial markets 
have seen an enormous increase in cross-border fund transfers such 
that the daily turnover in the foreign exchange markets is now almost 
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$2 trillion USD per day.121  This exceeds the value of traded goods.  
With such a large number of financial transactions taking place, those 
who wish to monitor fund transfers and find and intercept funds going 
to finance terrorist activities find themselves confronting a daunting 
task.122  
The impact on air travel across the United States and around the 
world has been enormous – between 9/11 and 2009, airlines lost $55 
billion.123  In the months after 9/11, airline revenues were down 
worldwide, causing roughly 100,000 airline workers to lose their jobs 
around the world.124  And, of course, four fully-loaded, fully-fueled 
commercial aircraft were destroyed in the attacks of 9/11.125  Nearly 
18,000 businesses were disrupted, relocated, or destroyed as a result of 
the attack in New York, and the Gross City Product of New York 
City was reduced by over $27 billion during the remaining months of 
2001 and 2002.126  According to Douglas A. McIntyre, the editor 
of 24/7 Wall St., a financial commentary website, the typical terrorist 
targets are “strategic assets, like oil fields and financial institutions.”127  
III.   TERRORISM UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Law is considered to be an instrument of social control.128  The 
idea is that society attempts to achieve uniformed behavior by gener-
ally describing behavior that is prohibited.129  The desired behavior is 
then encouraged by discouraging the undesired behavior through 
punishment.130  The populations of many states today consider them-
selves to be living under the rule of law.131  They believe that the rule 
of law bestows upon them, as citizens, the advantages of the preven-
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tion of arbitrary and corrupt government, the restraint of vengeance, 
and the provision of individual liberty and economic prosperity.132  
Some of the very first principles of the concept of the rule of law 
are that a law must be made public and must be reasonably clear and 
specific in meaning and in what it prohibits.133  And, of course, it must 
be applied equally to all, that is, without discrimination.134  The rule of 
law is considered an essential element of a functioning democracy and 
a functioning economy.135  This sentiment has been echoed time and 
again by many,136 including the United Nations itself, which said: 
Promoting the rule of law at the national and international levels 
is at the heart of the United Nations’ mission.  Establishing re-
spect for the rule of law is fundamental to achieving a durable 
peace in the aftermath of conflict, to the effective protection of 
human rights, and to sustained economic progress and develop-
ment.  The principle that everyone – from the individual right up 
to the State itself – is accountable to laws that are publicly prom-
ulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, is a 
fundamental concept which drives much of the United Nations 
work.137  
Another principal tenet of the rule of law is that government 
should maintain peace and order, for the most part through a system 
of laws or rules that specify both violations and their corresponding 
sanctions accruing to violators, leading at least one set of writers to 
point out that:  “Liberal democracies are especially susceptible to ter-
rorism because elected officials are expected to protect the lives and 
property of their electorate or face defeat in a subsequent election.”138  
This leads to the notion that no act can be regarded as a crime, unless 
there is a specific law prohibiting it, and no one can be punished, un-
less they have committed an unlawful act described as a crime.  Legal 
scholars refer to these concepts as nullum crimen sin lege (“no crime 
without a law”) and nulla poena sin crimine (“no punishment without 
a crime”).139  In other words, crimes must be clearly defined.140 
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Their world has no international crime of “terrorism” in the 
sense of a delicta juris gentium.  Further, terrorism, in and of itself, is 
neither a war crime nor a crime against humanity.141 
With no international definition of terrorism,142 can one call in-
ternational terrorism a crime with any authority?  Can one be prose-
cuted under a crime that has no definition?  In this context, what is 
the role of the rule of law that we all espouse?  I suggest that if the 
international community is serious about stopping international ter-
rorism under color of law, then a definition is needed. 
In 1926, Romania suggested that the League of Nations promul-
gate a treaty to outlaw and provide sanctions to those who engage in 
terrorist activities.143  In the 1930s, the international community 
wished to set up a unified regime regarding international crimes, and 
terrorism was discussed at a number of international conferences dur-
ing the early years of that decade.144  The first important modern at-
tempt to define terrorism as an international crime was undertaken by 
the League of Nations,145 resulting in the 1937 Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of Terrorism.146  Even though it was adopted 
by the League147 and signed by twenty-four states,148 it was only ratified 
by one state149 and did not enter into effect.150  It failed to gain traction, 
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because war was coming,151 and as some have suggested, because a 
number of states believed the definition of terrorism was too broad.152  
In those days, terrorist acts were, more often than not, attacks or 
attempted assassinations of heads of state, royalty, or political figures, 
not normally against large civilian groups.153  The circumstances sur-
rounding the drafting of the 1937 Convention concerned the assassi-
nation in 1934 in Marseille, France of the visiting King Alexander I of 
Yugoslavia.154  In that attack, the Foreign Minister of France was also 
killed, simply as collateral damage, when a French police officer shot 
him accidentally in the ensuing melee.155  As we all know, terrorist 
attacks have become more violent since that time. 
In the twenty-first century, terrorists have changed tactics and 
targets.  The United Nations Security Council Resolution of 2001 told 
all states to issue legislation that would make terrorist acts a crime.156  
Such statutes were to include financing, planning, preparation, and 
support for terrorism and the commission of acts of terrorism in such 
crimes.157  Because the resolution was issued under Chapter VII of the 
charter, it was mandatory on all states and not merely precatory.158  
However, the resolution did not define terrorism.159  Apparently, 
states were to fend for themselves and define terrorism as they 
wished, if they could.  
With no definition – and no comprehensive treaty – the United 
Nations is concerned that the organization cannot “develop a com-
prehensive strategy against terrorism, . . . and . . . [t]his prevents the 
United Nations from exerting its moral authority and from sending an 
unequivocal message that terrorism is never an acceptable tactic, even 
for the most defensible of causes . . . .”160  Roberta Arnold, an interna-
tional lawyer, scholar, and former legal adviser to the Swiss Depart-
ment of Defense also believes that, without a comprehensive treaty, 
bringing responsible parties to justice is a recurring problem,161 and 
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cites, among others, the failure to arrest Abu Abbas, the leader and 
person responsible for the 1985 Achille Lauro high jacking, until the 
United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003.162 
Many acts considered to be acts of international terrorism are 
separate crimes under the laws of various states.163  Further, many 
states have attempted to define terrorism, and a variety of definitions 
appear in their statutes.164  However, what is considered terrorism in 
one country – whether they use that definition for their own domestic 
legal purposes or for international legal purposes – is not considered 
terrorism in another.165  Definitions vary to a considerable degree and 
“[s]panning several continents, an international network cynically 
exploits national differences in the tolerance of foreign terrorists, in 
the liberality of laws of asylum and extradition, and in the preserva-
tion of civil liberties.”166  Some international lawyers currently believe 
that the recent attempts by liberal democracies to make counterter-
rorism laws have even gone too far,167 and conclude that “no State can 
legally adopt strategies aimed at combating international terrorism if 
those strategies simultaneously derogate from established interna-
tional human rights norms.”168  The Security Council has also voiced 
this concern; for example, in Security Council Resolution 1624, a 2005 
anti-terrorism resolution required states to: “ensure that any measures 
taken to implement this resolution comply with all of their obligations 
under international law, in particular international human rights law, 
refugee law and humanitarian law.”169 
Attempts at definitions have taken one of, at least, two ap-
proaches.170  One is a generic definition, self-inclusive into which pre-
sumably all – or most – terrorist acts would fit.171  Some call this a 
“top-down” or deductive approach.172  The other approach uses a va-
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riety of clearly and narrowly defined categories of acts that, when tak-
en together, make up an open-ended framework for defining – often 
only implicitly – and suppressing terrorism.173  This is known as a 
“ground-up” or inductive method,174 something Rohan Perera, Chair-
man of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee to Eliminate Terror-
ism, called an “operational approach,” one much like that taken by 
traditional criminal law.175   
The governments of many states have taken the deductive ap-
proach by attempting to make a catch all definition.176  For example, 
Title 22 of the United States Code defines terrorism as follows:   
 
(d) Definitions 
As used in this section— 
(1) the term “international terrorism” means terrorism 
involving citizens or the territory of more than 1 coun-
try; 
(2) the term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant 
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents; 
(3) the term “terrorist group” means any group, or 
which has significant subgroups which practice, interna-
tional terrorism; 
(4) the terms “territory” and “territory of the country” 
mean the land, waters, and airspace of the country; and 
(5) the terms “terrorist sanctuary” and “sanctuary” 
mean an area in the territory of the country— 
(A) that is used by a terrorist or terrorist organization— 
(i) to carry out terrorist activities, including training, 
fundraising, financing, and recruitment; or 
(ii) as a transit point; and 
(B) the government of which expressly consents to, or 
with knowledge, allows, tolerates, or disregards such use 
of its territory and is not subject to a determination un-
der— 
(i) section 2405(j)(1)(A) of the Appendix to title 50; 
(ii) section 2371 (a) of this title; or 
(iii) section 2780 (d) of this title.177 
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As can be seen, under this United States statute, state terrorism 
is not included in the definition of international terrorism since only 
“subnational groups” or “clandestine agents” can commit terrorism.178  
Another United States definition of terrorism is found in the Code of 
Federal Regulations: “the unlawful use of force and violence against 
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian 
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or so-
cial objectives.”179  It may surprise people to know that “almost every 
agency of the United States government that deals with the threat 
of terrorism maintains its own definition of that phenomenon.”180  It 
should not be surprising that other states have trouble with a uniform 
definition.181 
The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation defines ter-
rorism as: 
Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use, or threatened use, of 
force or violence by a group or individual based and operating 
entirely within the United States or Puerto Rico without foreign 
direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or 
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment 
thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives. 
International terrorism involves violent acts or acts dangerous to 
human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United 
States or any state, or that would be a criminal violation if com-
mitted within the jurisdiction of the United States or any state.  
These acts appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civil-
ian population, influence the policy of a government by intimida-
tion or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by assas-
sination or kidnapping.  International terrorist acts occur outside 
the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of 
the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they ap-
pear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their 
perpetrators operate or seek asylum.182 
Some have made the definition a catch-all that can be used not 
only to protect the populace but also to suppress political dissent.  
Such an example is the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Ter-
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rorism entered into by the League of Arab States.183  This group de-
fines terrorism as: 
Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, 
that occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective 
criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, causing 
fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in 
danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment or to 
public or private installations or property or to occupying or seiz-
ing them, or seeking to jeopardize a [sic] national resources.184 
This, of course, is an international – though not universal – defi-
nition.185  It is a very broad definition and does not appear to require 
any political or ideological motive, so what in some countries would 
be a traditional crime, could be considered terrorism under this defini-
tion.  Russia’s 2006 law, called On Counteraction to Terrorism, de-
fines terrorism as “‘practice of influencing the decisions of govern-
ment, local self-government or international organizations by intimi-
dating the population or using other forms of illegal violent action’ as 
well as the ‘ideology of violence.’”186  The notion of “other forms of 
illegal violent action” seems broad indeed. 
Terrorism is a word charged with emotion and one which is often 
used as a propaganda tool by governments.187  For example, the Kur-
distan Workers Party says the Turkish government paints the Kurdi-
stan Workers Party as a terrorist group for internal political purpos-
es.188  The United States State Department publishes annual reports 
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on terrorism and keeps track of terrorist incidents worldwide,189 but 
the definitional problem has caused London’s The Guardian to ques-
tion whether such statistics are meaningful,190 and to suggest that “any 
classification of terrorist groups is fundamentally motivated by self-
interest.”191  One problem with defining anything is that of distinguish-
ing it from what it is not.  Terrorism appears to be no exception.    
Most definitions include the ideas of involving violence and sowing 
terror or fear within a population; and do not provide any exemption 
for struggles for self-determination.192  Of course, a government’s 
counterterrorism activities would also likely include violence, and as 
most statutes respecting the prevention of crime, would also likely be 
designed to strike fear in the hearts of would-be “terrorist[s],” rather 
than “‘innocent’” populations.193  Therefore, some clarification ap-
pears necessary in any definition.  Further, as Professor Ruth Blakely 
of the University of Kent in Canterbury, England, points out, even 
democracies, sometimes engage in terrorism or sponsor terrorism.194  
Should an exception be made, that is, should state-sponsored or state 
terrorism be excluded from the definition?  This generates trouble-
some sticking points for many states in arriving at a consensus on a 
definition.195  Totalitarian states are often loath to closely define state 
terrorism or state-sponsored terrorism.196  Former colonies, develop-
ing countries, and many states in the Middle East want to clarify that 
any definition should exclude struggles for self-determination or vio-
lent actions taken to push out an occupying force.197  Relations among 
states are dominated by the self-interest of sovereign states,198 and 
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despite the fact that states have treaty obligations to prosecute inter-
national crimes,199 state sovereignty is a major obstacle to the effective 
enforcement of international crimes.200 
The United Nations General Assembly came close to a working 
definition in its 1994 declaration, entitled “Measures to Eliminate In-
ternational Terrorism,” condemning “all acts, methods and practices 
of terrorism.”  It called terrorism: 
Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror 
in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for 
political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever 
the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, 
ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justi-
fy them.201 
Even this definition does not say what a “criminal act” is.202  Is it a 
criminal act under international law (with universal jurisdiction?), or a 
criminal act under a state’s domestic law?  If the Resolution refers to 
domestic law, that is potentially problematic because, as stated, do-
mestic criminal law definitions vary considerably from state to state.203  
Of course, a General Assembly declaration or resolution does not 
make or have the force of international law204 though such a declara-
tion can either reflect or eventually give rise to customary interna-
tional law if it is followed by enough states on a consistent basis and is 
supported by the subjective effect of opinion juris.205 
Why have the world community and the United Nations Legal 
Committee been unable to reach a consensus?  Why can they not de-
fine terrorism and agree upon a comprehensive convention to elimi-
nate terrorism, approving and ratifying the draft which has languished 
since 2000?  According to Thalif Deen, United Nations Bureau Chief 
and Inter Press Service Regional Director for North America, there 
are at least two main sticking points in reaching a consensus defini-
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tion:  the question of state terrorism – or state-sponsored terrorism – 
and the notion that populations occupied by a foreign power have a 
right to resist and so a definition of terrorism should not preclude that 
right.206   
According to Deen, the “hard-line position on ‘terrorists,’ ‘state 
terrorism,’ and ‘freedom fighters,’ have mostly come from Arabs.”207  
He said that one Arab diplomat has commented, “there will never be 
an agreed definition of terrorism as long as the Palestinian issue re-
mains unsettled.”208 
It appears that the concept of state terrorism is politically 
charged.  Some consider the United States’ occupation of Iraq as 
“state terrorism.”209  The United States would not want such a defini-
tion to include those activities, but certainly United States’ presidents 
have used the term state-sponsored terrorism on a variety of occa-
sions without giving it a specific or generic definition.210  A number of 
powerful actors on the world stage may be apprehensive about any 
definition including state or state-sponsored terrorism, since many 
have been accused of engaging in the activity.  
Although the International Court of Justice did not use the word 
“terrorism” or “state-sponsored terrorism” in the case Nicaragua v. 
United States, the court found that the United States had engaged in 
and sponsored activities that many today would consider state-
sponsored terrorism.211  Troops of the United Kingdom were found to 
have engaged in actions that many objective observers would today 
call terrorism of the local population in Northern Ireland.212   
Belgian activities in Africa,213 French activities in Algeria, and the 
Russians in Chechnya, all could be considered by some to be state 
terrorism.  The Russians call the Chechen fighters terrorists; the Che-
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chen fighters say they seek self-determination.214  Little wonder that 
there is so much controversy over the terminology.  Some make the 
argument that there needs to be no new treaty or legal definition that 
would include state terrorism, since, they argue, international humani-
tarian law and the law of war (jus in bello) together deal with the mat-
ter well enough.215  Accordingly, as the acclaimed international law 
professor M. Cherif Bassiouni has said: “[Conventions] . . . only par-
tially addressed the problem, . . . [p]artly because the problem was 
addressed from the perspective of states seeking to control non-state 
actors, while failing to control state-committed and state-sponsored 
terror-violence.”216 
China has recently lamented the lack of an international defini-
tion as well as a domestic laws definition, stating they needed such a 
definition in their domestic law in order to better combat terrorist 
activities, which they say are plaguing the country.217  In October 2011, 
China therefore enacted a new anti-terrorism law that defines terror-
ist acts as:   
those intended to induce public fear, to harm public security or 
to coerce state organs or international organizations by means of 
violence, damage, threats or other tactics that cause or aim to 
cause severe harm to society by causing casualties, bringing 
about major economic losses, damaging public facilities or dis-
turbing social order . . . . ”218 
The language “or disturbing social order” seems to give the state 
a very broad scope of defining many acts as acts of terrorism.  
States are all over the waterfront in their definitions of terror-
ism.219  Table 3 below is a list briefly outlining a few states’ definitions 
of terrorism:220 
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Table 3, Countries & their domestic definitions of terrorism221 
 
Country 
 
General Description 
 
Comments 
 
Australia Similar definition to 
the UK222 
See Security Legisla-
tion Amendment 
(Terrorism) Act 
2002.  An action to 
advance a political, 
religious or ideologi-
cal cause and with the 
intention of coercing 
the government or 
intimidating the pub-
lic. 
                                                                                                                           
 221 Id.  
 222 UK Definition:  Terrorism: interpretation. 
(1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where—  
(a) the action falls within subsection (2),  
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international 
governmental organization or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and  
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, ra-
cial or ideological cause.  
(2) Action falls within this subsection if it—  
(a) involves serious violence against a person,  
(b) involves serious damage to property,  
(c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action,  
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the pub-
lic, or  
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic sys-
tem.  
(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of fire-
arms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.  
(4) In this section—  
(a) “action” includes action outside the United Kingdom,  
(b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to prop-
erty, wherever situated,  
(c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other 
than the United Kingdom, and  
(d) “the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of 
the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom.  
(5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference 
to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation.  
Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 1, as amended, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
ukpga/2000/11/section/1. 
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Austria No separate national 
definition. 
Terrorism referred to 
in the criminal code, 
but they are not spe-
cific terrorism of-
fences. 
Canada Similar definition to 
the UK. The legisla-
tive matrix is complex. 
Defined by specific 
references to UN 
Conventions and Pro-
tocols.  Acts intended 
to intimidate the pub-
lic or compel a per-
son, a government or 
a domestic or inter-
national organization 
to do or refrain from 
doing any act, inside 
or outside Canada; 
refers to serious inju-
ry or risk to health 
and safety, and sub-
stantial property 
damage. 
China Extremely broad. Includes aspects of 
freedom of speech 
and association. 
Egypt Very broad, substan-
tially unchanged since 
murder of President 
Sadat. 
Criticized by UN 
Human Rights 
Committee. 
France Broad. Code refers to dis-
turbance to public 
order by means of 
intimidation or ter-
ror.  Would certainly 
characterize a serious 
idiosyncratic criminal 
(e.g. Thomas Hamil-
ton) as a terrorist. 
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Russia Broad in terms of ac-
tions, with intention to 
undermine public se-
curity, terrorize the 
population, or pressur-
ize the authorities to 
take decisions.  
 
Spain Vey broad definition 
of terrorism; also, ag-
gravated form of ordi-
nary crime where in-
tention is to subvert 
the constitutional or-
der or to effect serious 
disturbances of public 
order. 
Special court system 
for dealing with ter-
rorism; procedurally 
different from other 
serious crime. 
Switzerland Broad definition com-
parable to UK. 
Statutory defense if 
intention is to estab-
lish or re-establish a 
democratic regime or 
the rule of law or to 
enable the exercise or 
safeguarding of hu-
man rights (Penal 
Code art. 260, para. 
3). 
United States 
of America 
USA PATRIOT Act 
of 2001. Very broad 
definition 
Department of State 
operationally describes 
terrorism as “premedi-
tated, politically moti-
vated violence perpe-
trated against non-
combatant targets by 
sub national groups or 
clandestine agents, 
usually intended to 
influence an audi-
ence.” 
Wide executive pow-
ers including access 
to confidential infor-
mation about citi-
zens.  A pendulum 
reaction to the events 
of 9/11. 
 
76 FIU Law Review [7:43 
There are at least three elements of definition that states and in-
ternational bodies have used in analyzing the inductive and deductive 
approaches:  a substantive element, a jurisdictional element, and an 
intent-oriented element.223  Normally the deductive approach is distin-
guished by a rather broad substantive element – that is, many actions 
could be included in the substantive definition – and “a general, polit-
ically oriented intent element.”224  Thus, the deductive method at-
tempts to abstract the general qualities of “terrorism” so that the ac-
tivities cover a wide variety of criminal conduct, but those activities 
constitute terrorism only in specific circumstance, namely in those 
circumstances described in the intent element.225  Hence, the intent 
element in the FBI definition of domestic terrorism:  “in furtherance 
of political or social objectives.”226 
The inductive method definition uses a fairly precise definition of 
the conduct that constitutes the substantive element and leaves out 
the political intent element that is found in the deductive approach.227  
This is the method that has resonated in the international sphere.228 
Rather than taking the deductive approach and fully deal with a 
comprehensive definition head on, the international community has 
chosen instead to take a “sectoral” approach, by means of which cer-
tain offenses that are considered activities of terrorists are identified 
and treaties (or conventions) are negotiated and signed covering those 
specific categories of offenses.229  
Those sectoral treaties include: 
 The 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts 
Committed On Board Aircraft230 
 The 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure 
of Aircraft231 
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 The 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation232 
 The 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hos-
tages233 
 The 1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material234 
 The 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Vi-
olence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation235 
 The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation236 
 The 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Fixed  
 Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf237 
 The 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for 
the Purpose of Identification238  
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 The 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Ter-
rorist Bombings239 
 The 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism240 
 The 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts 
of Nuclear Terrorism241 
Five of the foregoing treaties mention terrorism by name – the 
remaining seven do not.242  A typical preamble in one of the foregoing 
treaties (that mention terrorism by name) has words to the effect of, 
“[d]eeply concerned about the worldwide escalation of acts of terror-
ism in all its forms and manifestations,”243 but there is no definition of 
what that terrorism just mentioned, which gives rise to this concern.  
Apparently, whatever terrorism is, it gives rise to concern.  Addition-
ally, terrorism is not defined in any of the foregoing sectoral treaties.  
So for purposes of those mentioning terrorism – that is, mentioning a 
concern about it – someone who engages in the prohibited behavior is 
presumably engaged in an act of terrorism, although the treaties do 
not expressly say that. 
For now, it will be quite difficult for the international community 
to effectively counter a violent or disruptive act if it does not fall with-
in the foregoing conventions’ narrow definitions of activity.244 
Carlos Diaz-Paniagua, involved in coordinating the negotiations 
of the proposed United Nations Comprehensive Convention on In-
                                                                                                                           
 239 161 countries have either ratified or acceded to the treaty, including the United States. 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS 
AND CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/Special/1997%20International%20Con-
vention%20for%20the%20Suppression%20of%20Terrorist.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2012). 
 240 167 countries have either ratified or acceded to the treaty, including the United States. 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, U.N. OFFICE ON 
DRUGS AND CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/Special/1999%20International 
%20Convention%20for%20the%20Suppression%20of%20the%20Financing%20of%20Terrorism 
.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2012). 
 241 115 countries are signatories to the treaty, 49 of which have ratified or acceded to the 
treaty.  The United States has not ratified the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression 
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism, U.N.  OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME,  
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/Special/2005%20International%20Convention%20for
%20the%20Suppression%20of%20Acts%20of%20Nuclear%20Terrorism.pdf (last visited Feb. 
6, 2012). 
 242 Concise link to summary of above treaties.  International Legal Instruments to Counter 
Terrorism, UNITED NATIONS ACTION TO COUNTER TERRORISM, http://www.un.org/terrorism/ 
instruments.shtml (last visited Feb. 6, 2012). 
 243 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Preamble, 
Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197. 
 244 Bradley Larschan, Legal Aspects to the Control of Transnational Terrorism: An Over-
view, 13 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 117, 134 (1986). 
2011] Multinationals at Risk 79 
ternational Terrorism, believes that we need a precise definition of 
terrorism in international law, and he has said:  
Criminal law has three purposes: to declare that a conduct is for-
bidden, to prevent it, and to express society's condemnation for 
the wrongful acts.  The symbolic, normative role of criminaliza-
tion is of particular importance in the case of terrorism.  The 
criminalization of terrorist acts expresses society's repugnance at 
them, invokes social censure and shame, and stigmatizes those 
who commit them.245 
He goes on to say that such clear and universal criminalization 
may tend to deter terrorism, as those values become universally ac-
cepted.246 
We need, in other words, a clear definition of what terrorism ac-
tually is before we can implement a regime of criminal sanctions and 
define the scope of jurisdiction.  In its Baku Declaration, the Interna-
tional Progress Organization247 said: 
The United Nations Organization should urgently convene an in-
ternational conference with the aim of establishing a precise and 
legally sound definition of terrorism.  Unless this effort at codifi-
cation is undertaken, the term “terrorism” will continue to serve 
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only as a tool to justify brute power politics and to obfuscate the 
superpower policy of double standards.248 
At least one influential international lawyer, who has written 
widely on the subject, is convinced that “[t]he elaboration of a com-
prehensive convention on international terrorism will effectively con-
tribute to the prevention, control, and supervision of various forms 
and manifestations of [the problem].”249  The terrorist bombings in 
London in 2005 prompted then Secretary-General Kofi Annan to call 
for the UN Member states, through the UN Ad Hoc Committee on 
Terrorism, and especially the draft UN Comprehensive Convention 
on International Terrorism, to define, once and for all, the term “ter-
rorism,” inasmuch as the draft convention had been languishing for 
over 5 years, primarily because of definitions.250  After the UN legal 
committee failed later that year to reach such a definition, the Secre-
tary-General wanted the world leaders at the Millennium Summit of 
September 2005 to strongly condemn all acts of terrorism and issue a 
declaration that, among other things, would say: 
We affirm that the targeting and deliberate killing of civilians 
and non-combatants cannot be justified or legitimized by any 
cause or grievance, and we declare that any action intended to 
cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-
combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or 
context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a government 
or an international organisation to carry out or to abstain from 
any act, cannot be justified on any grounds, and constitutes an 
act of terrorism.251 
This would have gone a long way to providing a road map for an 
international definition – using the deductive approach – though of 
course any such declaration at a summit conference would be a politi-
cal event and not a practical legal solution.  Even so, it could have 
been persuasive, and would at least have tended to lock in those in 
agreement to a definition for later treaty-making.  In the event, the 
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declaration did not say the foregoing, did not arrive at a definition, 
but among other things said: 
“We strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifesta-
tions,” committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever 
purposes, “as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to in-
ternational peace and security.”252 
We stress the need to make every effort to reach an agreement 
on and “conclude a comprehensive convention on international 
terrorism" during the sixtieth session of the General Assembly.253 
This was no better than any other previous multilateral attempt, 
using a word to define itself.  The sixtieth session of the General 
Assembly came and went and still we had no comprehensive 
treaty with a definition.254   
Another problem with definition on an international level is how 
does one deal with strictly domestic “terrorism”?  Should it be treated 
in the same way as international terrorism?  In other words, terrorism 
of the variety that the international community should concern itself 
with?  And if so, should the perpetrators of those acts be subject to 
universal jurisdiction?255  Should the Europeans be concerned about 
hunting down and prosecuting an American who bombs the Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City, or should the Mexicans go after Chechens 
who assault a Russian schoolhouse?  Should any definition in a treaty 
include violence occurring within a state when perpetrated by nation-
als of that state with no outside involvement?   
There has been a long-standing tradition in international law and 
United States law that people engaged in certain political violence 
have the right of asylum and are neither detained nor extradited.256   
The process of reaching a consensus is fraught with obstacles, not 
the least of which is the general political nature of terrorism.257  This 
likely gives rise to the fact that the international community is at-
tempting to work in a context of both politics and law at the same 
time; this duality often gives rise to tension and conflict not only be-
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tween these two issue areas, but also among the various states that 
have their own take on both of these issues.258 
IV.   STATES HAVE DIFFERING AGENDAS AND DEFINITIONAL 
CONCERNS 
International law generally works very well, with states respect-
ing and following it on a daily basis, generally without question.259  For 
example, the rules of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, 
the World Trade Organization, and the attendant dispute resolution 
mechanism are highly evolved, respected, and they work effectively.260  
Aircraft fly from New York to Paris and around the world; letters are 
posted to overseas locations; ocean commercial fishermen go about 
their daily business; billions of dollars worth of goods are bought and 
sold.  All of this happens flawlessly as a result of international law, 
which governs all of the foregoing and much more.  No one even 
questions whether or not to follow the rules; they just do.261 
Can international law work in this matter of countering interna-
tional terrorism?  Those areas that are politically charged, such as the 
law of the use of force, like the law of war or defining an act as terror-
ism, give rise to considerable difficulties, with one nation justifying 
what they did under international law, and others condemning the 
activity as a violation of international law.262  Because areas of interna-
tional law that are fraught with politics give rise to disputes that are 
not easily resolved or even at times resolvable, many question the 
effectiveness of international law.  Most international law is not politi-
cally charged.  It just works.263 
V.   JURISDICTION 
As seen above, definition is a serious problem.  Another is juris-
diction, since for prosecution to take place, jurisdiction is required.  
We know that in general, the term jurisdiction refers to “a court’s 
power to decide a case or issue a decree.”264  In order to deal with a 
terrorist, a court would need personal or in personam jurisdiction:  the 
“power to bring a person into its adjudicative process”265 and subject-
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matter jurisdiction, that is, “over the nature of the case.”266  As one 
writer has said:   
The usual prerequisite a State needs to satisfy in order to exer-
cise criminal jurisdiction is the demonstration of a link between 
itself and either the facts in question, the effects thereof, or the 
authors of the alleged crime:  its involvement is justified accord-
ing to territoriality, personality, or security (the principle of pro-
tection).267 
There are certain crimes that are deemed to be so heinous and 
deemed to affect the entire international community that for them 
there is an exception to the aforementioned specific link.268  The 
crimes of piracy, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes 
against peace are such crimes,269 since such crimes are regarded as 
“particularly offensive against the international community as a 
whole.”270  Professor Stephen Macedo of Princeton University, an ad-
vocate of universal jurisdiction, probably described the benefits of the 
concept best when he said: 
Universal jurisdiction appears as a potent weapon:  it would cast 
all the world’s courts as a net to catch alleged perpetrators of se-
rious crimes under international law.  It holds the promise of a 
system of global accountability - justice without borders - admin-
istered by the competent courts of all nations on behalf of hu-
mankind.271 
In light of this, the 2005 resolution of the Institut de Droit Inter-
national states: 
Universal jurisdiction in criminal matters, as an additional 
ground of jurisdiction, means the competence of a State to pros-
ecute alleged offenders and to punish them if convicted, irrespec-
tive of the place of commission of the crime and regardless of any 
link of active or passive nationality, or other grounds of jurisdic-
tion recognized by international law. 
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Universal jurisdiction is primarily based on customary interna-
tional law.  It can also be established under a multilateral treaty 
in the relations between the contracting parties, in particular by 
virtue of clauses which provide that a State party in the territory 
of which an alleged offender is found shall either extradite or try 
that person.272    
At the end of the day, there is a prevailing view, prejudice really, 
that terrorism is a subjective matter, and that “one person’s terrorist is 
another person’s freedom fighter.”273 
VI.   CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR A WAY FORWARD 
Companies have an obligation to protect their employees, their 
customers, and their shareholders’ wealth.  Trade associations and 
their company members can work to make themselves less attractive 
targets for terrorist acts.   
With respect to a comprehensive treaty and a definition, it can be 
argued that if a person commits an act that falls between the cracks of 
the sectoral treaties – even though some would consider the act to be 
terrorism – and if he or she is arrested for that act pursuant to an In-
ternational Criminal Court (“ICC”) subpoena or by a country having 
no connection to the crime, that person would have a very strong ar-
gument that: (1) the ICC or the state court has no jurisdiction to act in 
the matter; and (2) the person committed no crime for which he or 
she can be prosecuted and should be set free. 
According to the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law, trade means faster growth, higher living standards, and 
new opportunities through commerce.274  The United Nations believes 
that trade, commerce, and business encourage economic develop-
ment; economic development brings with it better living standards for 
the world.275  Economists also believe this.276  Conversely, things that 
disturb or impede trade, commerce, and business, would therefore 
likely impede development and development’s concomitant rise in 
global living standards.  Terrorism, as has been discussed, impedes 
                                                                                                                           
 272 Universal Criminal Jurisdiction with Regard to the Crime of Genocide, Crimes Against 
Humanity and War Crimes, Resolution, INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, SEVENTEENTH 
COMMISSION (Aug. 26, 2005), http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2005_kra_03_en.pdf. 
 273 ARNOLD, supra note 161, at 335.  
 274 Unitral, About Unitral, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about_us.html. 
 275 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 66/94, Report of the Sixth Committee (A/66/471) 66/94, Report of 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Forty-Fourth 
Session (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/66/ActionbyGA.shtml (follow “66/94” 
hyperlink under “GA Resolutions & Decisions).  
 276 See HENDRIK VAN DEN BERG, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS ch. 1 (2004). 
2011] Multinationals at Risk 85 
trade; causes business to slow down; and causes business to spend 
time and money in security, insurance premiums, and rebuilding after 
a terrorist attack; they lose business and Foreign Direct Investment is 
discouraged.277 
Yet, there seems to be no real effort on the part of business on a 
global scale to deal with the problem except on a piecemeal basis.  
There is no concerted effort, and some multinationals are larger than 
nation states.  They do have some clout.  I find no evidence of multi-
nationals lobbying their governments to push for a definition of inter-
national terrorism, a crime that concerns us all.  I suspect that it may 
be out of an ignorance of the problem, simply trusting that their gov-
ernments and the international community, the UN perhaps, has dealt 
with the issue by now.  
International chambers of commerce and other trade and indus-
try groups can and, I suggest, should, on a transnational basis, arrive 
at a consensus respecting a workable definition.  They might be able 
then to persuade their respective governments to push for interna-
tional consensus on such a definition. 
What should such a definition entail?  First, the targets need to 
be included in any such definition: innocent people, assets, infrastruc-
ture, systems, and technology. Violence needs not be a requirement 
since the attack of a computer system, infrastructure, or a water sup-
ply would not necessarily entail violence, but could have a devastating 
effect.   
Second, the motivation should be addressed since general crimi-
nal statutes in states’ domestic laws deal adequately with the physical 
acts that most incidents of terrorism entail.  Motivations such as reli-
gious, ideological, and political should be included.  The objective 
should also be part of a definition:  the intention of influencing a 
group or a government to do or abstain from doing something; to 
change a policy or implement one through acts designed to cause ter-
ror, fear, or apprehension. 
Because of the strongly-held beliefs of a variety of people, espe-
cially in the non-industrialized world or former colonies, there should 
be exceptions for struggles of national liberation or defense against 
occupying powers.  This may serve two purposes:  to get a fair number 
of such countries to sign on to such a definition, and to discourage 
states from the unauthorized use of force, of attacking, attempting to 
annex, colonize, or otherwise occupy other states.  Further, such a 
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definition could perhaps leave out state terrorism and state-sponsored 
terrorism because those issues are likely fairly well-covered by the 
Geneva Conventions, international humanitarian law, and customary 
international law. 
In short, the issue of a definition of international terrorism – to 
include comprehensive treaty or convention outlawing terrorism and 
providing for its punishment and universal jurisdiction – has not been 
dealt with and companies large and small should lobby and sponsor 
educational programs to enlighten the populations of their countries 
about the problem.  Governments must be pressured to act.  Only 
then will we have a definition that the world cannot only live with, but 
can use adequately and collectively to fight the problem of terrorism.     
It must also be remembered that in any attempt to abolish and 
prevent terrorism, the states of the world must start with the proposi-
tion that violence of this nature does not have to be an inescapable 
reality like hurricanes or floods.  Terrorism is not a natural disaster; 
the murder of innocents is not a natural occurrence like bad weather.  
Unlike earthquakes, acts of terrorism require motives, planning, and 
human intention.  Accordingly, acts of terrorism are based on a calcu-
lated choice to use such acts to attain some end.  Terrorism should 
therefore, be preventable. 
                                                                                    
 
